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EPITEMOLOŠKA SODNOST DLA JE

Iz urednikove beležke

Odgovori na epistemološka vprašanja (pa tudi sama vprašanja) prihajajo iz vseh mogočih virov. Eden med njimi je kibernetsko-kognitivni teoretski sklop, ki se je rodil iz naravoslovnega okvira in ga predstavlja Lea Šugman Bohinc. Naslednjega prispevka, ki ga je spisal Gregor Adlešič, sicer ne moremo brez zadržka uvrstiti v epistemološki okvir, nas pa s kritiko Rawlsove moralne filozofije opozori na drug pomemben vir epistemoloških refleksij, namreč humanistiko in družboslovje. A epistemologija ima poleg različnih virov tudi različne definicije: od tistih, po katerih se v veliki meri prekriva s spoznavno teorijo (epistemologija kot teorija pogojev spoznavanja), do tistih, po katerih se kritično loteva same znanosti (epistemologija kot teorija pogojev znanstvenega dela in znanstvene misli). Zbližamo ju lahko, če vpeljemo polje, ki jima je skupno, namreč, polje vednosti, o katerem je veliko in zelo kritično pisal Foucault. Seveda pa se v tem primeru tehtnica močno nagne na stran humanistike in družboslovja, ali natančneje, izkaže se, da je razmejevanje del in kompetenc, ki izhajajo iz vednosti, povezano bolj z družbenimi razmerji kakor katerim koli (drugim) predmetom znanstvenega raziskovanja.

To gotovo ni mesto, kjer bi reševali ključne probleme znanosti, vendar jih tudi ne kaže ignorirati, ker se tesno navezujejo na pogoje praktičnega dela, ki so, kot nazorno pokaže Ivan Janko Cafuta, vse prej kot neproblematični ali neprotislovní. Gre prav zares za povezane teme, saj je tisto, kar se omenjenemu avtorju kaže kot eden poglavitnih problemov v praksi, prav slaba razmejenost del in kompetenc na centrih za socialno delo.

Kako negotova reč pa je t. i. »uporabna znanost«, pokaže v svojem prispevku Tanja Lamovec. Spominja se različnih – pogosto protislovnih – navodil, ki so jih ameriške matere v zadnjih 50 letih dobivale od najrazličnejših strokovnjakov za vzgojo otrok. Toda najresnejši nauk, ki izhaja iz njene analize, ni v tem, da je treba dobro premisliti, preden iz svojih ugotovitev izdelamo navodila za uporabnike in uporabnice, temveč v tem, da se vsako tako navodilo vsaj v času, ko je zveličavno, zdi popolnoma na mestu, tako rekoč edina prava stvar, ki jo lahko napravimo, če smo »na tekočem z znanstvenimi spoznanji«. Tudi če bo že jutri obveljala za popolnoma napačno.

Editor's Notes

The answers to epistemological questions (as well as the questions themselves) derive from all kinds of sources. One of them is the cybernetic-cognitive theoretical body born from natural sciences and presented here by Lea Šugman Bohinc. The next paper, written by Gregor Adlešič, cannot be immediately placed in the epistemological frame, yet in its critique of Rawls' moral philosophy it draws attention to another important source of epistemological reflections, human and social sciences. But besides different sources, epistemology has also different definitions: from those in which it overlaps to a great measure with gnoseology (epistemology as the theory of the conditions of cognition) to those in which it critically analyses science itself (epistemology as the theory of the conditions of scientific work and thought). They can be brought together if their common field is introduced, namely, knowledge, which was extensively and very critically studied by Foucault. But this, of course, tips the scales in favour of human and social sciences, or in more precise words, the differentiation of actions and capacities deriving from knowledge turns out to be far more related to social relations than to any (other) object of scientific research.

This is certainly not a place to solve key problems of science, yet they are not to be ignored, because they are closely related to the conditions of practice which are, as clearly presented by Ivan Janko Cafuta, hardly unproblematic or noncontradictory. That the themes are indeed parallel is indicated by the author's view that one of the main problems in practice is precisely weak differentiation of actions and capacities at social work centres.

What an uncertain thing the so-called "applied science" is, is shown in the contribution by Tanja Lamovec. She recalls different – often contradictory – prescriptions by a variety of American experts, designed for mothers raising their children, in the past 50 years. The most serious lesson from her analysis, however, is not merely that it is necessary to think hard before applying our findings as prescriptions for users, but the fact that every such prescription, at least at the time when it is valid, seems perfectly in place, the only right thing to do, as it were, if one is "up to date with scientific findings". Even if tomorrow it will be considered altogether wrong.